PUBLICATIONS

1) "The Law and Economics of Concealing Safety Information,” with Asrat Tesfayesus.  Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Spring 2017, vol. 13, number 2, pp. 181-208.

 

2) “Certainty Equivalence.”  The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, Edited by Mie Augier and David Teece, Palgrave MacMillan, October 2013.

 

3) “Civil Conspiracy Claims and the Economics of Collusion,” with Christopher Loos and Jonathan Tomlin.  Mass Torts, Volume 7, Number 3, Summer 2009, pp. 8-11.

 

4) “Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?” in Hilary Sigman, editor, The Economics of Hazardous Waste and Contaminated Land, Edward Elgar, 2008.  Reprinted from Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29 (1995): S-20 – S-33.

 

5) “Fly-By-Night or Face-the-Music? Premature Dissolution and the Desirability of Extended Liability,” with James Boyd.  American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003): 189-232.

 

6) “The Vertical Extension of Environmental Liability Through Chains of Ownership, Contract, and Supply,” with James Boyd.  In The Law and Economics of the Environment, edited by Anthony Heyes, 44-70. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001.

 

7) “An Analysis of Settlement and Merit Under Federal Securities Law: What Will be the Effect of the Reform of 1995?” with James Holloway and Ronald King. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 18 (1999): 1-30.

 

8) “Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?” with James Boyd. International Review of Law and Economics 19 (1999): 47-68.

 

9) “The Search for Deep Pockets: Is ‘Extended Liability’ Expensive Liability?” with James Boyd. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13 (1997): 232-258.

 

10) “Should ‘Relative Safety’ be a Test of Product Liability?” with James Boyd. Journal of Legal Studies 26 (1997): 433-473.

 

11) “An Experimental Investigation of Multi-defendant Bargaining in Joint and Several and Proportional Liability Regimes.” with Nicholas Dopuch and Ronald R. King.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (1997): 189-221.

 

12) “The ‘Polluter Pays Principle’: Should Liability Be ‘Extended’ When the Polluter Cannot Pay?” with James Boyd. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practice, no. 79 (1996): 182-203.

 

13) “Market vs. Government: The Political Economy of NIMBY.” with Gerald R. Faulhaber. In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence, Edited by Roger D. Congleton, 169-188. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996.

 

14) “Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29 (1995): S-20 – S-33.  Reprinted in Hilary Sigman, editor, The Economics Of Hazardous Waste And Contaminated Land,  Edward Elgar, 2008.

 

15) “Triggers and Priority: An Integrated Model of the Effects of Bankruptcy Law on Overinvestment and Underinvestment.” Washington University Law Quarterly 72 (1994): 1341-1377.

 

16) “Non-Compensatory Damages and Potential Insolvency.” with James Boyd. Journal of Legal Studies 23 (1994): 895-910.

 

17) “An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization.” with John J. Villani. American Journal of Political Science 37 (1993): 429-471.

 

18) “Incumbent Reputations and Ideological Campaign Contributions in Spatial Competition.” Mathematical and Computer Modeling 16 (1992): 147-169. (Reprinted in Formal Theories of Politics II: Mathematical Modeling in Political Science, edited by P.E. Johnson. Pergamon Press, 1992.)

 

19)  “Presidential Commitment and the Veto.” with Dennis A. Yao. American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991): 357-389.

 

20)  “Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control.” with Dennis A. Yao. Public Choice 70 (1991): 151-179.

 

21) “Reputational Dynamics in Spatial Competition.” Mathematical and Computer Modeling 12 (1989): 479-496. (Reprinted in Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modeling in Political Science, edited by P.E. Johnson. Pergamon Press, 1989.)

 

22)  “The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy.” with Robert P. Inman. In Surveys in Public Sector Economics, edited by Paul G. Hare, 105-160. Basil-Blackwell, 1988.

 

23) “Reputation, Commitment, and the Dynamics of Effective Legislative Leadership.” Public Choice 55 (1987): 121-126.

 

24) “Privatization: Your Rents or Mine?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6 (1987): 607-611.

 

25) “Candidate Reputations and the ‘Incumbency Effect.’” with M. Daniel Bernhardt. Journal of Public Economics 27 (1985): 47-67.

 

26) “Running Against the Status Quo: Institutions for Direct Democracy Referenda and Allocations Over Time.” Public Choice 46 (1985): 19-43.